Suretyship: Defenses of Surety: Estoppel by Foster, Gerrit D.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 2 February 1934 Article 10
Suretyship: Defenses of Surety: Estoppel
Gerrit D. Foster
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Gerrit D. Foster, Suretyship: Defenses of Surety: Estoppel, 18 Marq. L. Rev. 137 (1934).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol18/iss2/10
RECENT DECISIONS
there is unlawful picketing the courts will enjoin it to prevent irreparable in-
jury to property and property rights. However, in so doing, they will frequently
have to make fine distinctions between peaceful persuasion and annoyance, moral
coercion and intimidation. Truax v. Corrigan, supra.
The Wisconsin legislature tries to make this distinction between lawful and
unlawful picketing and in 1931 legalized peaceful picketing. Thus section 268.20,
(1), (e), Wis. Stats., provides that "Giving publicity to and obtaining or com-
municating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any
place where any person or persons may lawfully be, without intimidation or
coercion, (italics writer's) or by any other method not irvolving fraud, violence,
breach of the peace, (italics writer's) or threat thereof" shall be legal. Subsec-
tion (2) of the same section provides that "No court, nor any judge or judges
thereof, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction which, in specific or general terms, prohibits any person
or persons from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the foregoing acts."
(i.e., peaceful patrolling and picketing, etc.). It is hardly necessary to point out
how much room for judicial discretion remains, and necessarily so.
There has geen in the past a blind abuse of the injunction power by the
courts, resulting in greater class hatred, and in more contemptuous disre-
spect for justice than ever before. Statutes such as the above and the Federal
Statute passed in 1921 limiting the courts somewhat in their power to grant in-
junctions in trade disputes, combined with a more liberal public opinion and a
more socially minded judiciary than has existed in the past, are leading to a
more impartial adjudication of labor disputes.
CAROLINE AGGER,
ERNEST 0. EISENBERG.
SURETYSHIP-DEFENSES OF SURETY-ESTOPPEL.-By the terms of a trust agree-
ment the creditors of a construction company agreed to be paid pro rata from the
proceeds of a proposed mortgage and to furnish materials needed-for the com-
pletion of a building on land owned by the company. The plaintiff, a creditor,
executed the agreement only because the defendant, a trustee, guaranteed, indi-
vidually, to pay the balance of its account remaining unpaid after the distribu-
tion of the balance of the proceeds of said mortgage. The materials were fur-
nished and the work of completion started. The mortgagee of the proposed
mortgage could not advance the funds. The trustees, without knowledge or con-
sent of the plaintiff, negotiated in place of the proposed mortgage another mort-
gage of larger denomination. The proceeds of this mortgage were insufficient
to meet the necessary disbursements and the creditors received nothing. The
plaintiff sued on the guaranty. Motions for nonsuit and directed verdicts by both
parties were refused. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff covering its
full account. From the judgment the defendant appeals on grounds of improper
submission to the jury. Held, that the case was properly submitted to the jury.
Judgment affirmed. Mosaic Tile Co. v. Jones, (N.J. App., 1933) 168 Atl. 629.
The defendant for one defense contended that the placing of a new and
larger mortgage released his obligation on the guaranty. A variation from the
terms of the original contract is different from an alteration. Ap alteration of a
material character releases the guarantor because the contract is destroyed. A
variation from the terms of the contract gives the surety an equitable defense.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
To avail the surety, the variation must be injurious to him. Arnold, Suretyship
and Guaranty (1927) § 115; Arant on Suretyship (1931) § 67. The foregoing
theory was applied where the owner failed to insure as called for in the princi-
pal contract and no fire occurred. Schreiber et. al. v. Worm, 164 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.
852 (1904); Hohn v. Shideler, 164 Ind. 242, 72 N.E. 575 (1904) ; criticized in 18
Har. Law Rev. 626 (1905). Contra, Watts v. Shuttleworth, 5 H.&N. 235, 157 Eng.
Repr. 1171 (1861). It was also applied where the owner made additions to a
building contrary to the contract but paid the expense from his own pocket.
The surety was held not to be injured and was not discharged. Prescott National
Bank v. Head, 11 Ariz. 213, 90 Pac. 328, 21 Ann. Cas. 990 (1907) ; see 21 Har.
Law Rev. 63 (1907). But where a creditor shipped goods on an f.o.b. shipping
point basis instead of prepaid as called for in the contract, Chandler Lumber Co.
v. Radke, 136 Wis. 495, 118 N.W. 185, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 713 (1908), or advanced
more than the 80 per cent of the wholesale price at greater than the 6 per cent
interest, provided for in the original contract, Commercial National Bank of
Washington v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 10 F. (2d) 641,
56 App. D.C. 76 (1925), the surety was discharged. The Wisconsin Court said
that the surety had a right to define exactly the conditions upon which he shall
be responsible and unless the variation appear to be wholly immaterial and
without prejudice to the surety's rights, he will be released. Chandler Lumber
Co. v. Radke, supra; for an expression of a similar thought see, Fond du Lac
Harrow Co. v. Bowles, 54 Wis. 425, 11 N.W. 795 (1882) ; Stephens v. Elver, 101
Wis. 392, 77 N.W. 737 (1898). As a matter of policy it seems unwise to rely
upon the immateriality talk of the Wisconsin Court unless it is the only defense
available. The better rule seems to be that if the variation is not obviously imma-
terial, the surety is discharged. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
based its decision on the general statement that the contract of suretyship should
be strictly construed, and since the transaction did not come within the scope of
the bond, the surety was not bound to answer; and it is not material whether or
not the surety would suffer any actual disadvantage because of the variance.
Con tnercial National Bank of Washington v. London & Lancashire Indemnity
Co. of America, supra.
It is apparent that the courts are confused and can no longer rely on a broad
rule of law based on the classification suggested by the textbook writers. The
rapid growth of complex commercial dealings has outstripped the rules of law.
Justice Cardozo, in commenting upon the rule releasing the surety for an exten-
sion of time, remarked, "Such rules are survivals of the days when commercial
dealings were simpler, when surety companies were unknown, when sureties were
commonly generous friends whose confidence had been abused, and when the
main effort of the courts seems to have been to find some plausible excuse for
letting them out of their engagements. * * * I think we may well ask ourselves
whether the courts are not under a duty to go farther, and place this branch of
the law upon a basis more consistent with the realities of business experience and
moralities of life." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, (1921) pp.
152-155. The key to the problem is not whether the surety has been harmed.
The question before the courts is a problem of construction of the surety's con-
tract. The construction is based on the intention of the parties as expressed and
as reasonably implied by the present-day business relationships, and dealings,
and requirements for credit transactions. Each case should be independently con-
strued in the light of its individual problem, reflected against present-day, good
business usage.
RECENT DECISIONS
The court in the instant case placed a reasonable construction on the surety
contract. But in refusing the defendant's contention, no longer of importance in
view of the construction given the contract, by holding that he was estopped to
assert such a defense, the court erred; for the reasoning imputed strength to the
defense when in reality there was none; and the doctrine of estoppel was ap-
plied without considering the defendant's dual capacity.
GERmT D. FOSTER.
TRUST REcEIPTS-CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRAcTS-ESTOPPEL.-Defendant, a
finance corporation, in dealing with A, an automobile dealer, received from the
manufacturer bills of sale. Defendant would then forward the bill of lading,
together with a sight draft for 10 per cent of the purchase price, a note for the
remainder and a trust receipt to a bank in A's community. The A company then
would pay the draft and execute the note and trust receipt, and upon paying
freight take possession of the cars. The trust receipts contained the usual pro-
visions as to holding in trust, etc., A further agreeing not to sell, incumber, or
otherwise dispose of the cars until all the payments were completed. Plaintiff
company was engaged in buying chattel mortgages and conditional sales agree-
ments. A represented to plaintiff that a car had been sold to one X, on a condi-
tional sales agreement and offered plaintiff the contract. Plaintiff investigated the
credit of X, found it satisfactory, bought the contract and recorded it. This con-
duct was pursued a second and third time with Y and Z, as supposed buyers. In
fact X, Y, and Z never purchased the cars, their names being inserted on the re-
spective contracts by A. The automobiles never left the possession of A, and
were taken into possession of the defendant upon default of A on the notes in
September, 1931. Action by plaintiff to recover the cars. Judgment for plaintiff,
and motion for new trial denied; appeal. Held, judgment reversed. No one can
transfer better title than he has. Plaintiff is not a bona fide purchaser. The rule
of estoppel applies only if the party asserting it can show that he was in fact
misled to his prejudice. Plaintiff had no knowledge with reference to the cars.
Iowa Guarantee Mortgage Corporation v. General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion, (S. Dak., 1933) 250 N.W. 669.
Trust receipts have been interpreted by the courts as conditional sales, New
Haven Wire Comrpany Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 At. 266 (1899); Mershon v.
Moors, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N.W. 95 (1890) ; as chattel mortgages, in Kentucky, In re
Draughn & Steele Motor Co., 49 F. (2d) 636 (E. D. Ky., 1931) ; in New Jersey,
Karkuff v. Mutual Securities Corp. et al., 108 N.J. Eq. 128, 148 At. 159 (1928) ;
and in Texas, Comercial Credit Co. v. Schlegel-Storseth Motor Co. et al., 23
S.W. (2d) 702 (Tex. Comm. of App., 1930) ; and as a bailment, in Pennsylvania,
Brown Bros. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 904 (1894) ; in Nebraska, General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N.W. 627 (1925); and in
California, Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, 195 Cal. 27, 231 Pac. 340 (1924). Thus
it is seen that the courts are as yet undecided as to its inherent nature, and the
variance in the holdings has been to give or deny protection. In the viatter of
L. E. Lee, Bankrupt, 6 Am. Bankruptcy Rep. (N.S.) 437 (Ref. W. D. Wis., 1923).
It is in the nature of a pledge transaction, with delivery to the pledgor for
a: temporary purpose, In re Smith-Flynn Cointnission Co., 292 Fed. 465 (C.C.A.
8th, 1923). The bona fide purchaser from the holder of the cars has always been
protected by the court under situations similar to the instant case, Glass v. Con-
tinental Guaranty Co., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876, 25 A.L.R. 312 (1921); Indiana
